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Abstract
This paper briefly and informally surveys diﬀerent theoretical models of rel-
ative concerns and their relation to inequality. Models of inequity aversion in
common use in experimental economics imply a negative relation between inequal-
ity and happiness. In contrast, empirical studies on happiness typically employ
models of relative concerns that assume that increases in others’ income always
have a negative eﬀect on own happiness. However, in these latter models, the
relation between inequality and happiness can be positive. One possible solution
is a rivalry model where a distinction is made between endowment and reward
inequality which have respectively a negative and positive eﬀect on happiness.
These diﬀerent models and their contrasting results may clarify why the empiri-
cal relationship between inequality and happiness has been diﬃcult to establish.
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1 Introduction
There is an increasing acceptance that the welfare of individuals is not solely determined
by their material circumstances but also depends heavily on their relative position in
society. One way to explain this would be to assume that people care directly about the
consumption or utility levels of others, people have “social preferences”. For example,
if people have a strong preference for social status, it would not be surprising if a high
ranking individual in a poor country could be happier and healthier than a low ranked
individual in a rich country even if they have the same real income. Another is to
attempt to explain such relative concerns as arising from the economic incentives that
arise in tournament-like situations. Simply put, if life is a tournament where prizes are
awarded to a society’s winners, it would be rational to seek high social position.
Either way, the literature on relative concerns has enormous implications for the
study of inequality. The Second Welfare Theorem apparently separates issues of equal-
ity and eﬃciency and has led several generations of economists to believe that the
desirability or otherwise of greater equality is purely a question of subjective taste.
However, the new evidence for the strength of relative concerns suggests not only that
important externalities exist, but they are considerable in magnitude. This opens to the
door to the possibility that changes in the distribution of income can have a significant
eﬀect on eﬃciency, that redistribution could be benefit even those who lose financially
and that taxes have the potential to be Pareto-improving.
Data that supports the relative position hypothesis comes from at least three di-
rections. First, the growing literature on the economics of happiness that analyses
survey data on subjective wellbeing has given rise to the “Easterlin Paradox” (Easter-
lin (1974)). Average happiness scores do not rise or rise only slowly despite considerable
growth in living standards. However, happiness scores in cross-section are increasing in
income: at a given point in time, richer people are happier than poorer people.1 Second,
if one has the economist’s traditional dislike of subjective data, there also seems to be
a status gradient in a very material dimension, that of health. A number of studies
have found that one’s relative position, as well as one’s absolute standard of living, is
important in determining mortality (see Marmot (2004), Wilkinson and Pickett (2006)
for overviews). Third, a wide range of choice experiments have provided support for
the idea that people’s decisions are influenced by relative income. Explicit models of
social preferences have been fitted to this data by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and others.
There is now an extensive literature on the extent and importance of this phenomenon.2
1Since Easterlin’s original work, similar patterns have been found by more recent research on sub-
jective wellbeing. See Clark et al. (2007) for a detailed survey. Another survey of empirical research
on happiness goes as far as to conclude that in determining happiness “It is not the absolute level of
income that matters most but rather one’s position relative to other individuals” (Frey and Stutzer,
2002, p411).
2The literature is too large to do more than note some of the prominent alternatives. Charness and
Rabin (2002) argue that people care more about the intentions of others than over the distribution of
income per se. List (2006) finds that social preference models do not predict behaviour well outside
the laboratory.
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More recently still, Fleissbach et al. (2007) find evidence of social comparison in reward
processing centres of the human brain.
Some economists have made specific policy proposals based on the existence of rela-
tive concerns. Since relative concerns imply that Joneses’ wealth or visible consumption
may have a negative eﬀect on the Smiths, standard microeconomic theory suggests that
suitable taxes could improve welfare by correcting these negative externalities. Indeed,
Robert Frank (1985, 1997) and Richard Layard (2005) have argued that, in this context,
progressive taxation should be Pareto improving. Similarly, the main thrust of Marmot
(2004) is that greater equality should improve health.
However, there is a hidden problem in much of the literature in this area. It is
assumed that that if there is a status gradient in health or happiness, that is health and
happiness are influenced by relative position, then necessarily health and happiness are
decreasing in the level of inequality. This is a logical fallacy because there are plausible
models of relative concerns in which social standing matters and hence there is a status
gradient and yet welfare is increasing in inequality. For example, the most common
reason advanced for inequality causing bad health is that low status causes high levels
of stress. Yet when one looks at a formal model of status competition, as will be done
in this essay, it turns out that greater inequality reduces competition and can make
people better oﬀ. Of course, it may still be true empirically that inequality is bad for
both health and happiness. However, the relationship between inequality and welfare
under relative concerns remains less straightforward than is generally admitted.
One diﬃculty in clarifying the theoretical arguments is the number of existing dif-
ferent models. First, there are models where relative concerns are ordinal, individuals
care about their rank, but also other models where concerns are cardinal, individuals
care about how much higher or lower they are than other people. Second, in some
models individuals have relative concerns over income or wealth, in others the concerns
are over consumption. This makes a diﬀerence when consumption is a choice variable,
as then relative concerns induce a strategic situation. Third, there is a crucial diﬀerence
in the way diﬀerent models treat an individual’s concerns over incomes or consumption
that are below her own. Specifically, while all such models presume that others having
greater wealth lowers one’s own utility, some assume others having less wealth raises
one’s utility, others assume that it lowers it. Thus, some models assume competitive or
rivalrous preferences, while others assume what is called inequity aversion.
In this essay, I make three simple points. First, that the exact form of relative
concerns is largely irrelevant in explaining the Easterlin paradox or the presence of a
status gradient. That is, if one wants to explain why happiness is not growing in rich
countries or why a high ranked individual in a poor country can have better health than
a low ranked one in a rich country, it does not matter very much which model is used.
Second, in contrast, the form of relative concerns matters very much for determining
the eﬀect of inequality. And I find that the relationship between relative concerns
and inequality is driven by individuals’ attitudes to those who have a lower income
than themselves, and not other factors such as whether relative concerns are ordinal
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or cardinal. Third, there is also a contrast in the form of relative concerns assumed
in happiness research and in experimental economics. In the experimental literature,
models that assume inequity aversion are more commonly used and have found some
support in the data. In contrast, in the happiness literature, researchers have almost
exclusively used the rivalrous types of preference where increases of income of those
poorer than you have a negative eﬀect. That is, implicitly they are using models that
imply greater inequality would raise happiness.
Thus, the form of relative preferences should not be ignored by anyone interested in
happiness, inequality or their intersection. Determining the appropriate form of relative
concerns is not just a question for theorists. It also matters because current empirical
studies have had diﬃculty establishing a robust relationship between inequality and
health and between inequality and happiness.3 A clearer theoretical picture would
clarify the empirical hypotheses to be tested. This would lead to cleaner and clearer
results and a better understanding of which policies to reduce inequality would actually
enhance welfare.
Thus, to this end, this essay outlines the theoretical arguments that connect relative
concerns and inequality. Section 2 summarises the basic models. Section 3 briefly
surveys recent work on the underlying causes of relative concerns. Section 4 and 5
show that, while all models are capable of explaining the Easterlin paradox, they can
imply quite diﬀerent relationships between equality and happiness. Section 6 makes the
argument that it is the attitude to those poorer than you that is making the diﬀerence.
Section 7 shows that the relationship between inequality and happiness can further
depend on the form of inequality assumed. Section 8 briefly considers policy issues. All
this is done as simply and non-technically as possible. Thus, I hope this essay will help
to clarify the very important relationship between relative concerns and inequality.
2 Models of Relative Concerns
In this section, I outline some simple models of relative concerns. I show that a variety
of specifications have similar properties and are all capable of explaining the Easterlin
paradox. Easterlin’s original claim that economic growth has no eﬀect on happiness
does not seem to hold for poorer countries. But the finding that happiness increases
in income more steeply in cross section than average happiness increases with average
income seems to be very robust (see, for both claims, Clark et al. (2007)). In other
words, an increase in happiness for an individual from an increase in income for her alone
seems to be higher than from a similar increase in income for all agents. All models
surveyed in this section capture such relative eﬀects. We will later go on to show
3The conclusion of Deaton’s (2003) survey is that there is no clear link between inequality and
health. Wilkinson and Pickett (2006) claim that in fact the majority of studies support a negative
relationship. Alesina et al. (2004) find a negative relationship between happiness and inequality in
Europe and the US. Clark (2003) finds a positive relationship with UK data. Graham and Felton
(2006) find a negative eﬀect for the poor and a positive one for the rich in Latin America.
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that these diﬀerent specifications have very diﬀerent implications for the relationship
between inequality and welfare.
Taking a reduced form approach, a model of relative concerns assumes that an
individual i with income zi (or alternatively in some models, consumption) has utility
of the form
U(zi, z−i) (1)
where z−i represents the incomes of others, for example, given a population of n individ-
uals it would be a vector (z1, ..., zi−1, zi+1, ..., zn). In contrast, the standard neoclassical
assumption is that an individual’s utility depends only on his own income.4 But, like
neoclassical models, these models of relative concerns assume that only allocations mat-
ter, not the method or process by which they arrive. Thus, this approach does not allow
for considerations of justice or deservingness.5
Not surprisingly, the eﬀect of one’s own income zi on utility is assumed to be positive.
However, generally it is assumed that the eﬀect of an increase in income of someone who
is richer than you is negative (i.e. ∂U(zi, z−i)/∂zj < 0 for zj > zi). Following Friedman
(2005), let us call this eﬀect, “envy”. However, on the eﬀect of changes in income of those
who are poorer, there is less consensus. Some assume that any improvement for others
has a negative eﬀect on you (i.e. ∂U(zi, z−i)/∂zj < 0 for zj < zi). Friedman (2005)
calls this “pride” (a better name might be “competitiveness” or “downward envy”).
However, others assume that an improvement for those below you has a positive eﬀect
(i.e. ∂U(zi, z−i)/∂zj > 0 for zj < zi). Call this “compassion”. See Figure 1 for a simple
representation of this.
For the moment, let us concentrate on models with pride. One very simple obser-
vation is that an increase in utility for one individual arising from an increase in her
income will be larger than if her increase in income is accompanied by a similar increase
in income for someone else. As we will see, this property can oﬀer a simple explanation
of the Easterlin paradox.
We can further divide relative models with both pride and envy into two categories
on the basis of functional form. The first is often called the “keeping up with the
Joneses” model but perhaps is better called a model of mean-dependence.6 It assumes
that utility is increasing in one’s own absolute income zi but there is also a relative
component where one’s own income is compared with the average income of others z¯,
4It is true that in a standard model of general equilibrium, it is possible that, for example, an
increase in the income of some will raise the price of some good, hence decreasing the welfare of others.
This is sometimes called a pecuniary externality. However, models of relative concerns assume an eﬀect
that holds even with constant prices. Another way for the distribution of income to have a direct eﬀect
on individual welfare is when individuals contribute to public goods. See Dasgupta and Kanbur (2007)
for a recent treatment.
5Thus, this essay does not address these issues, even though they are undoubtedly important in
considering inequality.
6As Clark and Oswald (1998) point out a model that is mean dependent may not imply a desire to
“keep up” with others.
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Other’s income zj
Utility with compassion
Other’s income zj
Utility with pride
zi zi
Figure 1: Preferences exhibiting pride and compassion respectively. For a fixed own
income zi, we vary other’s income zj.
for example,
U(zi, z−i) = U(zi, zi − z¯) (2)
(an alternative formulation of U(zi/z¯) is also popular). This formulation goes back to
Duesenberry (1949) and has been used bymany authors including Boskin and Sheshinski
(1978), Abel (1990), Gali (1994), Harbaugh (1996), Clark and Oswald (1996, 1998) and
Futagamia and Shibata (1998).
Even this simple specification captures some of the basic properties of the empirical
stylized facts. For example, it produces a version of the Easterlin paradox. As hap-
piness/welfare is increasing in own income zi, it should be increasing in cross-section.
However, happiness may not rise over time for any individual whose income rises no
faster than average income. For example, if U is linear, there is no absolute component
to utility and the incomes of all rise at the same rate, average happiness will not rise.
Example 1 Suppose U(zi− z¯) = zi− z¯+1. Then, if incomes are distributed uniformly
on [0,1], utility ranges from 0.5 to 1.5 with an average of 1. That is, “happiness”
increases with income in cross-section. Now, suppose incomes all rise by 0.5, so that
the average income is now 1. The distribution of utility is unchanged and still ranges
from 0.5 to 1.5. Happiness does not increase at all in response to a general increase in
income.
Further, if U(·) is concave then if the incomes of the rich rise faster than the those
of the poor, then average happiness will fall. This is because the higher average income
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brings down the happiness of the poor, but the happiness of the rich increases only
slowly because they are in the relative flat area of the concave utility function.
Example 2 Suppose U(zi−z¯) =
√
zi − z¯ + 1. Initially, income is uniformly distributed
on [0,1] and average utility (i.e.
R 1
0
√
zi − z¯ + 1 dz) is 0.989. Suppose now that those
with above average incomes see a rise in income but those with below average income
remain unchanged. Specifically, suppose that the new income density is 1 on [0,0.5] and
2/3 on the interval [0.5, 1.25]. Average income is now 0.5625 and no-one’s income has
fallen. Yet, one can calculate that average utility is now lower at 0.983. Clearly, this
would not be possible under standard preferences.
The second group of models is based on rank. This approach was pioneered by
Layard (1980), Frank (1985) and Robson (1992). Given own income zi and and a
distribution of income F (·), utility is of the form
U(zi, z−i) = U(zi, F (zi)) (3)
One’s utility or happiness is increasing in own income zi but also in the rank F (zi) one
holds in income. This formulation has pride in the sense that, if a group of persons
who are currently richer than you had their income reduced to a level below yours, your
rank and hence your utility would increase.7
This form of utility function can also potentially explain the Easterlin paradox.
For a fixed distribution of income, the utility of an individual is definitely increasing in
income zi, as both the direct eﬀect ∂U/∂zi and through the eﬀect on rank ∂U/∂F ·f(zi),
where f(z) is the density of F (z), are both positive. An increase in income for a single
individual raises his consumption and, keeping other incomes constant, raises his rank.
Thus, happiness would be increasing in cross-section. However, when society as a whole
becomes richer, average rank must remain constant.
Example 3 Suppose we have a large population all with the same preferences, the ex-
treme case where U(zi, z−i) = F (zi), people only care about their relative position. Now,
average happiness is always 1/2, irrespective of the distribution of income (see Ko-
rnienko (2004)) so that material progress has no influence on happiness. However, the
richest always have a much higher utility than the poorest.
In behavioural economics, there is now an extensive literature on social preferences.
In contrast to the above models, it is generally assumed that individuals have “compas-
sion”. The inequity aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (FS) (1999) is perhaps the best
known. It assumes that utility depends positively on one’s own income, but negatively
7There is a technical problem in that this rank based specification is discontinuous in others’ incomes
when the population has finite size n. For each individual whose income drops below yours, your rank
jumps by 1/n.
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on the diﬀerence between one’s own income and that of others. For an individual with
income zi comparing herself with n other people with income z−i this has the simple
form
U(zi, z−i) = zi −
α
n− 1
X
zj>zi
(zj − zi)−
β
n− 1
X
zj<zi
(zi − zj) (4)
where α is a weight on the average of incomes that are above yours and β is a weight
on the average of incomes below yours.
FS assume that α ≥ β and that β satisfies 1 > β ≥ 0. Given α is positive we have
what we called envy, a dislike of others having more. If β is positive, then low incomes
for others reduce one’s own utility, that is, there is “compassion”. But if, contrary to
FS’s assumptions, β were negative, then we have pride as then lower incomes for others
raises an individual’s utility. The relation between the FS model and a mean dependent
model is illustrated by the following manipulation of (4)
U(zi, z−i) = zi − β(zi − z¯−i)−
α+ β
n− 1
X
zj>zi
(zj − zi) (5)
where z¯−i is the average of z−i, incomes held by others apart from individual i. One can
see that if β is negative and equal to −α, the FS model reduces to a mean dependent
model such as (2). Or to put it another way, typical mean dependent models are the
special case of the FS model where pride is as strong as envy and there is no compassion.
As we will see, the FS model predicts a negative relation between happiness and
inequality. However, it is less successful at explaining the Easterlin paradox. This is
simply because in its original formulation (4) it linear in own absolute income. Suppose
all incomes are increased by the addition of $x. Then, it is easy to calculate that the
relative component of utility, the terms in α and β in (4), will be unchanged, and
consequently the change in utility will be determined by the first term in the utility
function (4) which is simply zi. So, utility for each individual would rise by x, the
same amount as the increase in incomes. Thus, in contrast to the data on happiness,
substantial rises in real incomes should lead to substantial increases in happiness.
The same problem can arise in the the mean dependent and rank models as well.
For simplicity, Examples 1-3 assumed utility depends only on relative income. More
plausibly, and to make a fairer comparison with the FS model, there should be an
absolute income component in utility. For example, for the mean dependent model
(2), one could add an absolute component to the formulation in Example 1 to obtain
U = zi+α(zi−z¯+1) where again α > 0 is used to weight the relative income component.
In Example 1, an equal increase in income had no eﬀect on happiness because it did
not change the relative income component of utility. But now there is also an absolute
income component, it is easy to see that such an increase in income this would lead to
a general rise in happiness.
Example 4 Again suppose a large population of individuals have the same utility func-
tion U = zi + α(zi − z¯ + 1) with parameter value α = 1/2 and initially incomes are
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uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and so we have UB(z) = 3z/2 + 1/4 and utility ranges
on [1/4, 5/4]. We now raise incomes by 1/2 so that we have a uniform distribution on
[1/2, 3/2]. Utility is now UA(z) = 3z/2 and ranges on [3/4, 9/4]. Everyone’s utility
has been raised by 1/2. Suppose instead that the absolute income component to utility
is concave so that for example, utility could be U = log(zi+ k) +α(zi− z¯+1) for some
constant k ≥ 1. It is easy to check that now increasing the incomes of all by some
amount x will raise all utilities but by less than x. For example, when k = 100, when
all incomes rise by 1, average utility only rises by 0.01.
That is, as the above example suggests, there is a relatively simple way to reconcile
these models with the Easterlin paradox. Simply assume that utility is strictly concave
rather than linear in own absolute income. For example, one can replace the original
formulation (4) of the FS model with
U(zi, z−i) = v(zi)−
α
n− 1
X
zj>zi
(zj − zi)−
β
n− 1
X
zj<zi
(zi − zj) (6)
where v(·) is an increasing but strictly concave function. Now, if the level of income
is high enough, general increases in income will have less than a one-for-one eﬀect
on average happiness. Specifically, it is easy to verify that the relative component of
the above utility function (the terms in α and β) is unchanged if everyone’s income
increases by the same amount. So, again we have the familiar story that an increase in
own income keeping others’ incomes constant will have a greater eﬀect than from raising
all incomes. Further, as the own income part of the utility function v(·) is concave, the
eﬀect of a general increase in income on utility could be quite small if incomes are
already large. That is, economic growth in rich countries would have a smaller eﬀect
on happiness than a similar increase in incomes in a poor country. For an illustration
of such a pattern, see, for example, Figure 4 in Clark et al. (2007).
Thus, one can capture some aspects of relative concerns either by dependence of
utility on mean income or by dependence on one’s rank in the income distribution or by
a model of inequity aversion. However, this is not to say that the diﬀerent formulations
are identical. For example, consider the changes in the income distribution seen in the
US over the past twenty years in which the very rich have become very much richer while
many others have seen little increase in real income. Suppose the median individual
has seen no change in real income, and by definition, still holds a rank of 1/2. Then,
under the rank based formulation (3), her utility or happiness would be unchanged.
However, under the mean based formulation (2), as mean income has risen, the same
person would feel worse oﬀ when contemplating her unchanged real income. This eﬀect
would be stronger still under the FS model (4).
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3 Why Do People Have Relative Concerns?
Concern for relative position seems deep rooted in human behaviour. An often repeated
idea is that relative concerns have been selected by competition for relative position in
our evolutionary past. The argument runs that men who were able to achieve high
position were able to reproduce much faster than lowly ranked men (evolutionary ex-
planations tend not to be gender-neutral). Thus, it became natural to care about
relative position. This is a possibility. But in fact, there are at least three diﬀerent
evolutionary or psychological explanations that have recently been proposed. Further,
there is an alternative hypothesis that relative concerns arise from current rather past
social arrangements. It is the tournament-like nature of economic competition that
gives individuals an incentive to make relative comparisons.
First, let us go back in time and imagine that you are a hunter-gatherer and some
other member or members of your tribe have just been conspicuously successful. Maybe
they just killed a mammoth. In any case, in response to their success you feel unhappy
and worried. You are angry and argumentative.8 Maybe, it is because you fear that the
successful hunters will use their newfound prestige and assets (fresh meat) to dominate
the tribe. Again, in this story, men should be particularly afraid about loss of access to
women due to the success of other men. In any case, let us call this the rivalry story.
But there are other potential reasons for this unhappiness at the success of others.
One recent alternative theory due to Samuelson (2004) and Rayo and Becker (2007)
is roughly the following. The unhappiness is Nature telling you that you are pursuing
the wrong strategy. If these others are having success from whatever it is they are
doing, then maybe you should be doing it too. Evolutionary selection has given you
concerns about others in order to give you an incentive to gather useful information
about potentially profitable activities. Let us call this the information story.
Finally, there is a story that is perhaps even more basic. Standard utility theory
assumes that preferences are complete. In practice, one could imagine that one has
to construct preferences One way would be from direct consumption experience: for
example, I prefer oranges to lemons as after tasting both I find oranges to be sweeter.
More generally one could construct an index of sweetness, a form of utility function,
by repeated sampling of foods. As a consequence, one’s evaluation of an individual
orange, for example, will depend on the overall distribution of oranges. This means of
constructing preferences has been considered by Kornienko (2004) and Stewart, Chater
and Brown (2006), following earlier work by Parducci (1965). But how does this relate
to relative concerns? The answer is that when one applies this methodology to assess
satisfaction with a level of income, then satisfaction should depend on that level of
income’s position within the distribution of incomes. That is, relative concerns arise
because it is a fundamental psychological mechanism to evaluate objects, opportunities
or incomes by means of relative comparisons. Let us call this the perception story.
8These negative responses to the success of neighbours are actually taken from contemporary society.
See Luttmer (2005).
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What do these stories tell us about relative concerns in contemporary society? Let
us look first at the rivalry story. Competition for marriage partners has been formalised
in a dynamic model by Cole et al. (1992). Let us sketch a simple, static version. There
is a large population of equal numbers of men and women. Suppose each man has utility
U(zi, xi, si) = (zi − xi)si (7)
where zi is initial endowment, xi is choice of visible investment, zi − xi is residual
consumption, and si is the quality of wife with which he matches. Notice that these
preferences are not “social”. There are no relative concerns and utility does not depend
on others’ incomes or consumption.
Men have continuous wealth distribution F (z) and women vary in perceived quality,
for example, in their own wealth with continuous distribution H(s). Let Φ(x) be the
distribution of investment amongst men. Note that unlike the distribution of income,
this distribution depends on men’s choices and is thus endogenous. Women’s preferences
over husbands are simply increasing in x, the investment that a man makes. All women
would therefore like to match with the man who chooses the highest investment. That
man would prefer to match with the woman with the highest s. The only matching
pattern that would be stable given such preferences is indeed where the highest ranked
man matches with the highest ranked woman, the second ranked man matches with
second ranked woman and so on.9 This generalises to the relation Φ(x) = H(s), a
man’s rank in the distribution of investment Φ(·) is equal to rank of his wife in the
distribution of women.10 But such assortative matching implies that, given a choice of
investment x, a distribution of investment Φ(x), a man will match with a woman of
quality s = H−1(Φ(x)) (to obtain this from Φ(x) = H(s) we just invert the function
H(s)). Now, to simplify further, suppose women’s quality is uniformly distributed so
that H(s) = s on [0,1], then we have s = Φ(x). Replacing that in the man’s utility
function (7), we have
U(zi, xi, s) = (zi − xi)Φ(xi) (8)
where Φ(x), remember, is his rank in investment. That is, because of competition
for marriage opportunities, the reduced form utility for men depends on their rank in
the choices they make. We go on to solve a model of this form in Section 5. But
the important message for now is that this form of tournament competition induces
people to act as though they had competitive social preferences, even though they
fundamentally only care about themselves. Social status is instrumental to material
benefits.
This is an important insight but it throws up a problem for the current enquiry. One
might hope that an evolutionary analysis would help in identifying the appropriate form
of relative concerns. For example, the rivalry story might support rivalrous preferences.
However, as argued by Cole et al. (1992) and Postlewaite (1998), it could be current
9Stability in matching problems means that there is no blocking pair: a man and a woman who
would both prefer to match with each other instead of their current matches.
10Assumed implicitly here is that there are no ties in men’s choices of investment. Such an outcome
is consistent with equilibrium as we will see.
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social arrangements, such as the way that marriage markets or the way that desirable
opportunities are assigned, that determine relative concerns. Rather than such con-
cerns being “hard-wired” by evolution, attitudes towards inequality, for example, could
change in response to changes in society. Even the perception stories suggest that peo-
ple’s preferences respond to their environment and experiences. Certainly, Cole et al.’s
instrumental story potentially would allow for diﬀerent forms of concerns in diﬀerent
countries or in diﬀerent social groups. Thus, there is no fundamental or fixed form of
relative concern.
4 Models of Relative Concerns In Which Greater
Equality is Welfare Improving
What we have seen is that models of relative concerns can provide simple explanations
for phenomena such as the Easterlin paradox. However, to this point, we have not made
a direct link between utility and inequality. We now see how a simple model of social
preferences can imply that an increase in inequality can have a direct negative eﬀect on
individuals who see no change in their own material circumstances.
The Fehr-Schmidt model was introduced in Section 2 and assumes a utility function
of the form (4). The equivalent in a large population with income distribution F (·) is
for the an individual to have utility
U(zi, z−i) = zi − α
Z ∞
zi
(y − zi)dF (y)− β
Z zi
0
(zi − y)dF (y) = zi + S(zi, z−i) (9)
Further, as Deaton (2003) notes, one can rewrite (9) above as
U(zi, z−i) = zi−β(zi−z¯)−(α+β)
Z ∞
zi
(y−zi)dF (y) = zi−β(zi−z¯)−(α+β)R(zi) (10)
where again z¯ is average income and R(zi) =
R∞
zi
1−F (y)dy is the measure of “relative
deprivation” introduced by Yitzhaki (1979).
This implies that the FS model has the additional property that utility can be in-
creasing in the degree of equality. It can be shown that if there are two distributions
F (z) and G(z) that have the same mean and same support and if F is more equal in
the sense of second order stochastic dominance (equivalently generalised Lorenz domi-
nance)11 then R(z) is lower at all income levels under F than under G. Thus, if as FS
assume α > β, then, even keeping her own income constant, an individual will have
higher utility in a more equal society. Note that this is a diﬀerent and stronger result
11Actually, here, as the means are the same, generalised Lorenz dominance is the same as Lorenz
dominance. If F Lorenz dominates G then the Lorenz curve associated with F is always closer to the
line of complete equality than that of G. Thus, it implies a lower Gini coeﬃcient. See, for example,
Thistle (1989) or Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007).
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than in Example 2 which concerns only average utility and relies on a change in average
income. With the FS model, it is possible for utility to fall at every level of income if
income becomes less equally distributed around an unchanged mean.
Example 5 Suppose a large population of individuals have the same utility function
(9) with parameter values α = 1/2 and β = 0, but diﬀer in their income. Specifically,
suppose under distribution FB(z) incomes are uniformly distributed on [0, 1] then we
have UB(z) = (−1 + 6z − z2)/4. We now make income more equally distributed, so
that for example, FA(z) = 3z2 − 2z3 which is a unimodal distribution on [0, 1] with
the same mean 1/2 as our initial uniform distribution (FB is a mean preserving spread
of FA). Utility is now UA(z) = (−1 + 6z − 2z3 + z4)/4. Note that UA(z) − UB(z) =
(−1+z)2z2/4 > 0 everywhere on (0,1). That is, utility is higher at almost every level of
income in a society with the same average income but less inequality. This is illustrated
in Figure 2 below.
In summary, the FS model predicts a negative relation between happiness and in-
equality at a given level of own income. Further, this is something that is not present
in rank or mean dependent models of relative concerns introduced in Section 2.
5 Models of Relative Concerns In Which Greater
Inequality is Welfare Improving
We have seen in the previous section that relative concerns can lead to a negative rela-
tionship between inequality and happiness. This might seem to be a natural outcome.
However, a simple observation is that the even the Fehr-Schmidt model implies that
greater inequality will, in contrast, be welfare increasing if the coeﬃcient β is negative
(“pride” or “downward envy” instead of “compassion”) and suﬃciently large in absolute
size, specifically if β < −α. This requires that individuals derive high utility from hav-
ing greater income than the poor. If this is the case, given equation (10), when β < −α,
the welfare of an individual will be increasing in the level of inequality in terms of the
relative deprivation. That is, individuals will prefer the incomes of others to be more
unevenly distributed when pride is stronger than envy. Of course, Fehr and Schmidt
themselves assume that, on the contrary, β ≥ 0.
However, let us separate empirical and logical arguments. It is an empirical issue
about which values of α and β best fit actual behaviour, and thus in practice which is
stronger, envy or pride. Indeed, it may be the case that for everyone β is non-positive,
there is no pride, only compassion.12 On the other hand, the model with β < −α is
internally coherent, and so one cannot rule out a priori this possibility. Indeed, most of
12Indeed, recent careful work by Blanco, Engelmann and Normann (2007) finds that all subjects in
the experiments they consider have “compassion” and not “pride”.
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the literature on relative concerns, introduced here in Section 2, assume that β = −α.
That is, it is a possibility that in a population where everyone has relative concerns, it
is nonetheless the case that greater inequality increases welfare.
This is not just a pedantic point. It is also possible to obtain similar results from a
model that is somewhat more plausible. Consider, for example, this simplified version
of the analysis of Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) which in turn is based on the model
of Frank (1985). This model also is analysed by Becker et al. (2005).
This involves a diﬀerent modelling approach to that used up to now. Suppose an
individual does indeed care about his relative position. The question is, how does
he know what it is? The Fehr-Schmidt model described in the previous section was
developed to describe behaviour in laboratory experiments where information about
what others receive is given to subjects. In social situations, however, wealth or incomes
of others are not necessarily known. People often infer the wealth of others by their
visible consumption choices, for example, the clothes they wear or what car they drive.
Knowing this, there is the possibility of “conspicuous consumption”, deliberate choice
of consumption to improve one’s apparent relative position.
To model this, we assume that a large population of agents all have relative concerns
over their position in visible consumption rather than in the underlying distribution of
income. Specifically, assume that there is some visible but otherwise worthless form of
consumption, expenditure on which we denote x. Suppose an individual with income
zi and visible consumption xi has utility
U(zi, xi, x−i) = (zi − xi)Φ(xi) (11)
where Φ(·) is now the distribution of visible consumption in the population (F (z) still
denotes the distribution of income). There is a tradeoﬀ for each individual, the greater
the expenditure on xi, the higher will be her relative position Φ(xi), but the less income
will be left for other consumption (her utility is increasing in this other consumption
which equals zi − xi). Note that this model is formally equivalent to the rivalry model
of Cole et al. (1992) introduced in Section 3.
This situation is strategic. An increase in consumption by one group of individuals
can lower the relative position of another. This leads to a particular diﬃculty relative
to the models considered in the previous section. Here, utility depends on a distribution
Φ(x) which is endogenous and determined by the choices of other agents. As Hopkins
and Kornienko (2004) point out, nonetheless, it is possible solve this problem by ap-
plication of techniques from auction theory. Here, an explicit solution to this simple
version of the model is given in the Appendix.
There are two main conclusions from this analysis. First, there exists an equilib-
rium in which conspicuous consumption is increasing in one’s income. This means that
the agent with the highest income will have the highest consumption, and more gen-
erally, each agent will have the same rank in consumption as in income. That is, in
equilibrium Φ(x) = F (z). That is, while individuals compete in consumption in order
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to improve their apparent rank, in equilibrium these eﬀorts cancel themselves out and
each maintains the same relative position.
Second, the amount of conspicuous consumption chosen by each agent and hence
welfare depend on the distribution of income in society. To see this, note that in
equilibrium the marginal cost of an increase in consumption must equal the marginal
benefit in terms of potential gain in rank. This benefit is proportional to the income
density f(zi). That is, the gain from greater consumption is higher when locally incomes
are dense. Intuitively, when consumers are close together in terms of income, other
things equal, it is easier to overtake others in consumption. Now, the point about this
type of equilibrium is that no-one overtakes anyone else: one’s rank in equilibrium is
the same as in the underlying distribution of income, or Φ(x) = F (z). But in order for
a pattern of consumption to be an equilibrium, consumption has to be high where the
density of income high so that no-one has an incentive to break ranks. Thus, in this
model of consumption rivalry, an increase in income equality increases competition.
This is crucial. Since greater competition leads to higher expenditure on conspicuous
consumption, but in equilibrium everyone keeps the same rank, greater equality can
make people worse oﬀ. Specifically, as shown in the Appendix, if incomes are more
equal then, in this model, utility is lower at every level of income.13 That is, for this
simple strategic model, we have the polar opposite result compared to the Fehr-Schmidt
model. Here, greater equality decreases happiness for a given income. There follows a
simple example of this.
Example 6 Suppose initially the distribution of income F (z) is uniform on [0, 1] so
that FA(z) = z then by the solution (15) derived in the Appendix we have xA(z) =
z/2. All consumers spend exactly half of their income on conspicuous consumption.
Equilibrium utility is UA(z) = z2/2. We now make income more equally distributed,
so that for example, FB(z) = 3z2 − 2z3 which is a unimodal distribution on [0,1] with
mean 1/2. Now, we can calculate that, first, equilibriums consumption is higher and
equilibrium utility is lower: equilibrium consumption is xB(z) = z(4 − 3z)/(6 − 4z)
which is greater than z/2 on (0,1) and equilibrium utility is now UB(z) = z3 − z4/2
which is strictly less than UA = z2/2 on (0,1). That is, we have exactly the opposite
eﬀect from greater equality to that of Example 5.
6 Which Story Should We Believe?
We have seen that if people have Fehr-Schmidt (1999) preferences (with the appropriate
parameter values) greater equality can increase welfare. In contrast, in the model
of conspicuous consumption of the previous section, greater equality increased social
13The strength of this result does depend on this very simple formulation (11). Hopkins and Ko-
rnienko (2004) show that, in a more general formulation, utility will be lower at low income levels in
a more equal distribution of income, but utility may be higher at high income levels.
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competition and lowered utility at each income level. This raises at least two questions.
First, what exact aspect of the diﬀerent models is driving the diﬀerent results? Second,
if we can isolate this particular factor, is there empirical evidence to support one set of
models over the other?
To address the first question, let us consider a model where people compete in terms
of conspicuous consumption but have inequity aversion. That is, what happens if we
blend the models of the previous two sections? Friedman (2005) has recently considered
a strategic model which does just this. In the current notation, he analyses a model
where an agent with income zi chooses consumption xi to maximise
U(zi, xi, x−i) = log(zi − xi)− α
Z ∞
xi
(y − xi)dΦ(y)− β
Z xi
0
(xi − y)dΦ(y) (12)
where Φ(·) is the distribution of consumption in the population. That is, utility depends
on non-conspicuous consumption zi − xi but also how one’s conspicuous consumption
compares to that of others. Relative concerns are modelled in the same way as Fehr
and Schmidt (1999) but in terms of the strategic variable, consumption.
Friedman finds that the outcome heavily depends on whether “pride” is stronger
than “envy” (that is, β < −α) or vice versa. In the first case, we have a similar
situation to that analysed by Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) (and summarised here
in Section 5).14 But perhaps the more interesting result concerns Fehr and Schmidt’s
preferred parameter values, that is when −α < β so that envy is stronger than pride.
Here, Friedman finds that there are multiple equilibria in each of which all agents
choose the same level of conspicuous consumption. The equilibrium where this level
is zero Pareto-dominates the other equilibria that have positive levels of conspicuous
consumption. Game theorists will recognise this pattern from games of coordination
where multiple, Pareto-ranked equilibria are common. Agents neither like having more
or less consumption than their neighbours so that there is conformity, they all choose
the same. Thus, rather than consumption being driven by the level of equality as with
rank-based preferences (11), conspicuous consumption is decided by convention.
This suggests that what is driving the diﬀerence in eﬀect of inequality is not whether
utility depends on rank as in (11) or diﬀerences in levels as in Friedman’s version of
the Fehr-Schmidt model. Nor is it important whether relative concerns are over an
exogenous distribution of income as in the models of Section 2 or over a strategic variable
such as conspicuous consumption, as in Section 5. Rather it is whether preferences
exhibit pride or compassion. When there is compassion and hence, inequity aversion,
greater equality raises utility, but when there are competitive preferences involving
pride, greater inequality can make people better oﬀ.
What is the empirical evidence for the diﬀerent forms of relative concerns? It is true
that Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) original study and recent work by Blanco, Engelmann
14Friedman looks at the case where all agents have the same income, which means that the only
equilibrium is in mixed strategies. However, I have done some preliminary calculations with income
heterogeneity and find results that are qualitatively similar to those of Hopkins and Kornienko (2004).
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and Normann (2007) find strong evidence for inequity aversion in the laboratory. But
outside the laboratory, most studies find the eﬀect of others’ income is negative, for
example, Luttmer (2005). However, such research typically does not distinguish the
eﬀect on happiness of changes in incomes of those who are richer from the eﬀect of
changes in income of those who are poorer. A partial exception is Blanchflower and
Oswald (2004) who find in data from the US that the income of the richest fifth has the
biggest impact on happiness of others. But the impact of the income of the poorest on
others’ happiness, though smaller in absolute size, has the opposite sign, giving some
evidence for inequity aversion. The fact that many people give to charity is also sug-
gestive that compassion is widespread. On the other hand, Brown et al. (2004) regress
employee satisfaction against both the average wage in the firm and the employee’s rank
in wages. Rank is found to be more important in predicting satisfaction. This provides
some support for rank based preferences over the average based alternative. Further,
this is more supportive of rivalrous preferences than of inequity aversion. However, this
question clearly requires more research.
7 A Model of Relative Concerns In Which Greater
Equality Can Be Positive or Negative for Welfare
Relative concerns do not have to arise from social preferences. We saw already in
Section 3, following Cole et al. (1992), that concern for rank can be generated by
competitive situations. One advantage of this strategic approach is that by changing
the nature of the game faced by the contestants one can change the nature of their
relative concerns. This possibility is exploited by Hopkins and Kornienko (2007b) who
note that inequality in a competitive setting can be thought of in two distinct ways.
Further, these two diﬀerent types of inequality will have completely diﬀerent eﬀects on
behaviour and welfare.
Suppose contestants start with diﬀerent initial endowments which they use to com-
pete in order to obtain diﬀering rewards. Therefore, there can inequality both in terms
of endowments and in rewards. Furthermore, these are logically separate. For exam-
ples, individuals could diﬀer widely in terms of ability, but rewards for high performance
could be only slightly greater than for low. Or, rewards for success could be very much
higher than for failure, even when individuals start with very similar endowments. Even
more importantly, it is possible to show that these two diﬀerent forms of inequality have
very much opposing eﬀects on welfare.
In eﬀect, we generalise the analysis in Sections 3 and 5. As in the simple tourna-
ment model of Section 3, we assume that contestants have utility of form (7), that is,
U(zi, xi, si) = (zi−xi)si where zi is initial endowment, xi is choice of eﬀort and si is the
value of reward that is obtained. Previously, it was assumed that the “rewards” were
potential spouses, but we can think of other situations where rewards could be in cash
or in terms of prestige. Assume again that there is a continuum of contestants with
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endowments distributed according to F (z) and there is a continuum of rewards with
distributionH(s). If rewards are assigned according to relative achievement, so that the
rank of reward assigned is equal to one’s rank in achievement in terms of performance
x. If so, then we have the relation H(s) = Φ(x) or equivalently, s = H−1(Φ(x)), which
gives a reduced form utility
U(zi, xi, si) = (zi − xi)H−1(Φ(xi)). (13)
That is, contestants face a very similar problem to that in the conspicuous consumption
model analysed in Section 5. Again the solution is in the Appendix.
This more general framework allows for a new question to be asked. What is the
eﬀect of greater equality of rewards? It turns out the eﬀect is the opposite to that
of greater equality of endowments. If rewards become more equal, then the marginal
benefit of raising one’s rank decreases. There is less competition, eﬀort falls, and utility
rises at every endowment level.
Example 7 Suppose the distribution of endowments F (z) is uniform on [0,1] and that
the distribution of rewards HA(s) is uniform on [0,1]. By our results in the Appendix,
equilibrium eﬀort is xA(z) = z/2 and utility is UA(z) = z2/2. We now make rewards
more equally distributed, so that for example, they are uniform on [1/4,3/4] still with
mean 1/2 or HB(s) = 2s − 1/2. Now SB(z) = H−1B (F (z)) = z/2 + 1/4 which means
that, given the equilibrium strategy (17) derived in the Appendix, eﬀort falls to xB(z) =
z2/(1+2z) which is lower than xA(z) everywhere on (0,1). Further, equilibrium utility is
now UB(z) = (z+ z2)/4 > z2/2 = UA(z) on (0,1). Utility is higher at every endowment
level under the more equal distribution of rewards. Since the distribution of endowments
is unchanged, this implies that everyone is better oﬀ under the more equal distribution
of rewards.
We saw earlier in Section 5, that in tournament-like models greater equality can
increase competition and make people worse oﬀ. Nonetheless, we now see that even
in such models, greater equality, in the form of greater equality of rewards, can be
beneficial.
8 Lessons for Policy
The point of this essay is that the relationship between relative concerns and inequality
is less simple than is sometimes assumed. Therefore, it should not be too surprising
if it is also diﬃcult to extract policy prescriptions from what is a broad and nuanced
theoretical literature. Nonetheless, there are some basic themes.
First, even the presence of inequity aversion amongst the whole population is gener-
ally not suﬃcient for redistribution to be Pareto improving. Significant redistribution
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away from rich individuals to poorer ones will make the rich worse oﬀ even if they have
what was described as “compassion” in Section 2. This is because models of relative
concerns typically assume that individuals care about their own income as much as or
more than they care about the incomes of others. Thus, it is unlikely that the increased
equality will be suﬃciently important to compensate for the loss of their own income.
Equally, although we have seen that greater inequality reduces competitive pressures in
the strategic model of Section 5, for similar reasons it is unlikely to generate a Pareto
improvement. The only example of greater equality making all better oﬀ is an increase
in the equality of rewards in the tournament model of Section 7.
However, in competitive models of the sort analysed in Section 5, the presence of
relative concerns in making consumption choices means that those choices are typically
distorted away from the levels that would be chosen in the absence of competition. For
example, if individuals have to choose between spending on a conspicuous and on a
non-conspicuous good, then in non-cooperative equilibrium, all could spend too much
on the conspicuous good. Hence, a tax on the conspicuous good could make everyone
better oﬀ. This idea is perhaps due to Duesenberry (1949), but see also Layard (1980),
Frank (1985), Ireland (2001), Kanbur et al. (2006) and Weisbach (2007).
The major theme of this essay, that diﬀerent forms of relative concerns have very
diﬀerent implications, also applies to these tax schemes. For example, as Hopkins and
Kornienko (2004) point out, a tax could be Pareto improving, but it may or may not
be progressive. In a rivalrous model, distortions will be largest, and therefore taxes
should be highest, near the modal income which in most societies is relatively low.15
In contrast, it is possible that if people competed in conspicuous consumption but had
preferences that were of the inequality aversion type (as in the model in Section 6) that
such corrective taxes would be progressive. However, at this stage, formal results of
this type are still unknown.
There is one final but important point to be made about the importance of the
form of relative concerns assumed. The type of expenditure that gives status can make
an enormous diﬀerence in the conclusions reached. For example, Frank (1985, 1999)
emphasises competition in terms of consumption. He, therefore, argues in favour of a
consumption tax to encourage saving and raise growth. However, in contrast, in the
classic work of Cole et al. (1992), social status can be found in capital accumulation.
Growth will be higher than in the absence of competition and can even be excessive
(Corneo and Jeanne (1997)). But there are others that have argued that competition
for social position is in balance beneficial. Becker et al. (2005) argue that competition
for status provides an incentive for the undertaking of risky activities such as entrepre-
neurship that otherwise would be under-provided. What is certainly true that one can
obtain almost the opposite eﬀects from social competition depending on whether status
is found in conspicuous consumption or in saving (Corneo and Jeanne (1998)).
15A related point is made by Corneo (2002) who observes that the Scandinavian countries have both
a relatively equal pre-tax income distribution and high taxes. He hypothesises that the high taxes may
be necessary to correct the high levels of social competition induced by the narrow income distribution.
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9 Conclusions
This essay started with the proposition that the presence of relative concerns does not
necessarily lead to a negative relationship between inequality and utility or happiness.
Indeed, in briefly surveying the recent theoretical literature, it became clear that there
are plausible models of relative concerns where inequality is bad, where it is good and
where diﬀerent forms of inequality can have opposite eﬀects.
However, this survey does suggest what is behind these diﬀerent responses to in-
equality. These models of relative concerns, social or other regarding preferences, diﬀer
along several axes. They can be ordinal or cardinal, individuals can care about their
rank or their distance from the mean in income or in consumption. However, what
really seems to matter is the attitude assumed over those with incomes less than one’s
own. While all models surveyed have a form of “envy”, others having more than you
is bad, some assume “compassion”, concern for those with less than oneself, while oth-
ers “pride”, satisfaction from others having less. It is the presence of compassion that
seems to be at the basis of inequity aversion and it the presence of pride that permits
a positive relationship between inequality and happiness in other models.
Even in these competitive models where pride dominates, one can make a distinction
between “good” and “bad” inequality. Inequality in initial endowments has quite an
opposing eﬀect to inequality in final rewards. The first discourages competition and
the second encourages it. Thus, greater equality of rewards can have as beneficial an
eﬀect in a model with pride, as greater equality of incomes can have in a model with
compassion.
My main argument is therefore that in order to understand the relationship between
inequality and happiness and health, researchers will have to be much more precise
about the form of relative concerns they assume. In terms of empirical work, it would
seem relatively simple to test, for example, whether higher incomes for the poor make
the middle class more or less happy. However, while existing experimental results
provide evidence for compassion over pride in the laboratory, I am not aware of an
empirical test of this hypothesis using happiness data (with the partial exception of
Blanchflower and Oswald (2004)). Therefore, to understand the role of inequality,
researchers might do better by examining how the eﬀect of others’ income varies across
the income distribution, rather than by simply regressing health or happiness on a single
measure of inequality.
This importance of the type of relative concerns also suggests that both empirical
researchers and theorists could do well to take greater account of heterogeneity. Casual
observation suggests that while some people are highly competitive, others are con-
formist. In the terminology I have used here, rather than assuming everyone has pride
or compassion, it is more likely that there is a mixture in the population. Hence, the
relationship between inequality and happiness could be yet more complex. I hope that
in pointing out these distinctions and in clarifying the mechanisms of social preferences
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and status seeking behaviour, this might provide an impetus for this and other research.
Appendix
In this Appendix, I sketch solutions to the strategic models introduced in Sections 5
and 7. Given all agents have utility (11) but diﬀer in income distributed according to
F (z), suppose all agents adopt the same strictly increasing strategy x(z), so that an
agent with income zi chooses consumption xi = x(zi). Let γ(x) be the inverse of this
strategy function so that zi = γ(xi). Note that rank Φ(xi) of the consumer i is equal to
the probability that consumer i has higher consumption than another randomly chosen
consumer j or
Φ(xi) = Pr[xi > xj] = Pr[xi > x(zj)] = Pr[γ(xi) > zj] = F (γ(xi)).
Therefore, if all other consumers use the strategy x(z) then consumer i has expected
utility (zi − xi)F (γ(xi)). Diﬀerentiating with respect to xi gives a first order condition
−F (γ(xi)) + (zi − xi)f(γ(xi))γ0(xi) = −F (zi) + (zi − xi)
f(zi)
x0(zi)
= 0, (14)
where f(z) is the income density and the second formulation follows as if consumer i
also uses the strategy xi = x(zi) then γ(xi) = zi (and γ0(xi) = 1/x0(zi)).
This defines a diﬀerential equation in income z. From (14), we have x0(z)F (z) +
x(z)f(z) = zf(z). Integrating both sides we have x(z)F (z) =
R z
0
tf(t)dt. We can then
obtain by integration by parts the following solution
x(z) = z −
R z
0
F (t)dt
F (z)
(15)
where F (z) is the underlying distribution of income.
Now, put (15) into the utility function (11) and use Φ(x) = F (z) to obtain equilib-
rium utility
U(z) =
Z z
0
F (t) dt. (16)
Note that, the distribution FA(z) is more equal in terms of second order stochastic dom-
inance (equivalently generalized Lorenz dominance) than another distribution FB(z) if
and only if
R z
0
FA(t) dt ≤
R z
0
FB(t) dt holds for all z. Thus, in a more equal society,
utility will be lower at every level of income.
Given the slight modified model (13), it is not too diﬃcult to use the above methods
to determine that there is an equilibrium strategy in strictly increasing strategies of the
form
x(z) = z −
R z
0
S(t)dt
S(z)
(17)
20
where S(z) = H−1(F (z)). This gives equilibrium utility of the form
U(z) =
Z z
0
S(t) dt. (18)
The parallels to the earlier results, (15) and (16), are clear. Indeed, greater equality
of endowments will have a similarly negative eﬀect as in the earlier, simpler strategic
model.
Greater equality of rewards, however, will have the opposite eﬀect. Thistle (1989)
shows that the distribution FA(z) is more equal in terms of second order stochastic dom-
inance (equivalently generalized Lorenz dominance) than another distribution FB(z) if
and only if
R r
0
F−1A (t) dt ≥
R r
0
F−1B (t) dt holds for all r in [0, 1]. For simplicity, assume
F (z) = z endowments are uniformly distributed. Then, if rewards are more equally
distributed in terms of second order stochastic dominance, it follows that equilibrium
utility (18) will be higher under the more equal distribution at every level of income.
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